Abstracr -Although the US. Navy has dccreed that the primary aim of the electric power systcin design will be for survivability and continuity of the clectrical power supply, metrics havc never been developed for continuity of service. This paper examincs design issues associated with providing continuity of service under other than combat damagc conditions and proposes a Quality of Service (QOS) metric to aid shipboard power systems desibm. This QOS metric is based on thc probability that the power systcm will provide the degree of continuity of power that each load nccds to support the ship's missions. The major factors impacting QOS arc the ratings, reliability and failure inodes of the prime movers, power conversion equipment, and load equipment as well as system Configuration. Additionally, while design features for QOS oAen improve system survivability, different failure modes require the designer to consider both survivability and QOS.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, even though the principal design considcrations for the design of U.S. Navy shipboard electrical power systems has been survivability and continuity of servicc, demonstrating that a power system providcs continuity of service through metrics has not been a standard practice [I] . Instead, prescriptive practices such as use of an N+l rule for generator selection and sizing were presumed to provide good quality of servicc. In the past, it has becn sufficient to use good enginecring judgment and lessons learned from previous designs to ensure acceptable levels of performance are incorporated into each contract design.
During the past fifteen years, acquisition reform including Cost As an Independent Variable (CAW) have put more and more emphasis on design optimization. Appropriate metrics are required to assess cost and operational effcctivcness and to support the Govcrnment's role of design ccrtification. Additionally, thc introduction of all electric auxiliaries (most notably are the large loads associated with resistive heating), zonal architectures, integrated power systems, and DC distribution systems has resulted in power systems very different from the radial power systems for steam ships on which our legacy prescriptive design practices are based. Because prescriptive design practices optimizcd for the evolving power system technologies planned for the next generation of warships do not exist, it makes sense to rely on performance criteria to assure a well designed power system that does not restrict innovation. To properly specify the work to be performed by the ship design agent and to certify the CAPT N. H. Doeny is with the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20376 USA (e-mail: norberi.doerry@navy,mil)
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This papcr examines the practical design issues associated with providing continuity of service under other than combat damage conditions and proposes a Quality of Service (QOS) metric to aid in the design, design certification and operation of shipboard power systems. The QOS metric proposed is based on the probability that the power system will provide the continuity of power that each load needs to support the ship's missions. The major faclors impacting QOS are the ratings, reliability and failure modes of the primc movers, power conversion equipment, and load equipment as well as systcm configuration. To properly calculale QOS, thc authors propose to classify loads into one of three QOS categories and to modify the Electric Plant Load Analysis (EPLA) process to includc thc QOS category for each load. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relationship of QOS to ship survivability and suggests future work to institutionalize the use of QOS metrics in ship design.
BACKGROUND
Since 1990, the design of naval electrical power systems has evolved from radial distribution systems for ship-service loads to zonal distribution systems that are integrated with electrical propulsion. [2] [3] . Figure I With the migration of steam auxiliaries to all-electric auxiliaries and resistive hcatcrs, as well as the introduction of integrated etectric propulsion, the power rating of generator sets has grown significantly in the past fifteen years. These largcr generator sets typically have a lower relative rotating moment of inertia, require longer to start and bring onlinc from a standby condition, and typically have an overload rating of 110% vice the 150% of smaller generators. The loss of a large generator presents a number of problems not prcviously faced. First, it will take longer for the standby generator to come online, Second, since the generator sets arc not capable of producing significant overload power, frequency regulation will falter at a lower overload rating. Finally, once frcqucncy regulation fails, it will happen much more quickly because of the lower relative rotating moment of 0-7803-9259-0/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE.
inertia. The bottom line is that generator sizing, protective relaying, and power systcm controls must all bc designed holistically to ensure satisfactory Quality of Service. 
DISCUSSION

A . Qiidt?, ofService
Quality of Service is a metric of how reliable a distributed system (electrical power system) provides its commodity (electrical power) to the standards required by the users. It is calculated as a (MTBF) of the power system as viewcd from the loads. A failure is defined as any intcrmption in service, or commodity parameters (Power Quatity) outside of normal limits, that results in the load equipment not being capablc of operating properly. The time is usually specified by an operating cycIe, Design Rcfcrence Mission (DRM), Concept of Operation (CONOPS) or an Operational Architecture.
Quality of Service is a reliability-like metric; as such the calculation of QOS metrics docs not take into account survivability events such as battle damage, coltisions, fires, or flooding. Quality of Servicc does take into account equipment failures and normal system operation transients. A typical cause of normal system operation causing a QOS failure is thc shifting of sources for the commodity such as shifting to/from shore power (without first paralleling) or manually changing the source of power using a manual bus transfer (MBT). Afso note that not all interruptions in servicc will cause a QOS failure. Some loads, such as rcfrigerators and chill boxes, will keep thcir contents cold even if power is interrupted for several minutes. In this case, a QOS failure will not occur as Long as power is restored in time to prevent significant heating of the contents. Notc that the optimal configuration of a distributed system may differ for QOS considerations and for survivability considerations. In thc electric plant for example, an important QOS consideration is the ability to prcscrve power to loads when a generation element trips off line while damage to the distribution system and the ability to preserve power to vital mission systems loads is of major interest in the survivability analysis. For QOS reasons, many ships operate with their electric plant paralleled in peacetime steaming and only shift to the morc survivable split plant configuration under threat conditions.
B. Un-interruptible Load
Un-interruptible Load is a proposed QOS term for catcgorizing electrical loads (Other proposed QOS load categories are Short-Term Interrupt and Long-Term Interrupt loads).
An electrical load wouId be classified as a Unintcrruptible Load if it can not tolerate power interruptions of 2 seconds. Wn-interruptible Loads should be capablc of tolerating transient intcrmptions of power of up to 10 ms in duration to enable standby power systems to switch. Unintermptible loads arc typically provided a Standby Power System, an Unintermptible Power Supply, or auctioncering DC diodes. Quality of Service Load Shedding is not performcd on Unintermptible Loads (Quality of Service Load Shedding is explained in paragraph 111 F).
C. Short Term Interrzipt Load
An electrical load is classified as a Short-Term Interrupt Load if it can tolerate power interruptions greater than 2 seconds but cannot tolerate interruptions of greater than 5 minutes. The two second limit is bascd on providing sufficient time for electromechanical switchgear to cicar faults in a coordinated manner, conduct Quality of Service Load Shedding of Long -Term -Interrupt Loads, and to reconfigure the electrical plant. The five minute limit is a nominal time in which a standby generator should be capable of starting and providing power. Quality of Service Load Shedding is not performed on Short Term Interrupt Loads.
D. Long Term Interrupt Load
An electrical load is classified as a Long-Term Interrupt Load if it can toleratc power interruptions greater than 5 minutes. Quality of Service Load Shedding is performed on Long Tcrm Interrupt Loads. Generally, standby gencrators should come on line within 5 minutes and restore power to Long Term Intempt Loads in less than five minutes. Once an interruption reaches 5 minutes in duration, the electrical plant shifts to Mission Priority Load shedding (explained in paragraph III G ) . Lowcr Mission Priority loads are shed while higher mission priority loads that are long term interrupt loads are restored.
E. Exempt Long Term hterriq~l Lo&
Certain long-term interrupt loads may be exempted rrom QOS calculations.
For IPS configurations, sufficient redundancy in generation is not provided to enable the ship to achieve its maximum speed with any one generator out of scrvice. Propulsion power for IPS ships may thus be split into three categories: Short Term Interrupt Load, non-exempt Long Term Interrupt Loads, and exempt Long Term Interrupt Loads. The installed generation capacity of the ship must be capable of supporting the ship service load and all categories of propulsion load with all generators online, and must support thc ship service load and all but thc Exempt Long Term Intcnupt Loads with one generator out of service.
Unless othcnvise specified in the ship's requirements documentation, all Long Term Interrupt propulsion loads should be designated exempt.
The concept of the "Excmpt Long Term Interrupt Load' is only used in sizing the installed gencration capacity of the ship. In operation, Quality of Service and Mission Priority load shedding is not sensitive to the Exempt Long Term Interrupt Load designation.
F. Q d i p ojService Load Shedding
Quality of Service Load Shedding occurs when online power generation capacity is insufficient to service all loads. During Quality of Scrvice load shedding, sufficient Long Term Interrupt Loads are shed until the online power generation capacity is sufficient to meet the power demand. If shedding of Long Term Interrupt Loads does not sufficiently lower the power demand, then Short Term Interrupt loads and Un-interruptible loads are shed based on Mission Priority Load Shedding. The start of a standby generator is also initiated to increase online power generation capacity. If after five minutes power has not been restored to Long Term Interrupt Loads, Mission Priority Load Shedding is initiated. This may result in restoring power to higher priority Long Term Interrupt loads by shedding power to lower priority Short Term interrupt and Un-interruptible loads.
G. Mission Priori[v Load Shedding
If power generation or distribution capacity is not sufficient and cannot be made sufficient to meet demand within the quality of service power interruption time interval, a Quality of Service failure will occur. Mission Priority Load shedding ensures that the towcst priority loads for a given operational condition suffer the quality or service failure, while the highest priority loads maintain continuity of servicc. This generally means that at the end of the Long-Term fnterrupt interruption interval of 5 minutes, lower mission priority Uninterruptible and short-term interrupt loads are shed to enable restoration of service to higher priority long-term interrupt loads.
H. Dessipz Reference Mission
A Design Reference Mission (DRM) is a timcline consisting of a scqucnce of planned operations of the ship conducted during a specified mission duration. The DRM is used to help determine which equipment should be operational and the probability that a givcn power systcm element will fail in calculating Quality of Service melrics. For a robust ship design, multiple DRMs may be used to stress different aspects of the ship design.
The role of a DRM may be fulfillcd by Operational Architecture views if a DoD Architecture Framework is used.
Specifically, well defined Operational Activity Models (OV-5) and Operational Activity Sequcnce and Timing Descriptions (OV-6A, 6B, and 6C) should satisfy the requircments for a DRM [4] .
I. Stirvivcihilip
Survivability for future ship designs will likely be defined by Design Threats and Design Threat Outcomes. A design threat is a thrcat to the ship whcre a Design Threat Outcome has becn defined. Examples of Design Threats could be specific cruisc missiles, torpedocs, guns, explosives, weapons of mass dcstruction as well as accidents such as main space fires, helicopter crashes, collisions, and groundings.
The besign Threat Outcome is a metric for total ship survivability and is defined as the acceptable performance of the ship in terms of the aggregate of susceptibility, vulnerability, and rccoverability whcn exposed to a design threat. Design Threat Outcome definitions could include statements such as:
Ship will likely be lost.
Ship will tikely remain afloat and not be capable of performing one or more primary mission areas for a period of time exceeding onc day.
Ship will likely remain afloat and be capable of performing all of its primary mission arcits following restoration efforts not exceeding two hours using only organic assets.
Ship will likely remain afloat and would likely be capable of performing all of its primary mission areas without interruption.
The levels of survivability for the design threats can be evaluated using Total Ship Survivability Assessment (TSSA) methods [SI. The assessment of susceptibility should include Quality of Service to ensure the availability of threat dcterrent systems that are dependent on electric power. The assessment of vulnerability should includc the effect on mission capability of the design threat with respect to Quality of Service failures. Analysis of Quality of Service failures and their impact on mission capability is also important in the assessment of recoverability. lWTBF
IV. QOS AND ELECTRIC PLANT DESIGN
If every element of the power systcm can achievc an A, of greater than about 0.995 and thc failures are random and independent, then the probability of multiplc simultaneous failures is sufficicntly low therefore thew cases can be ignored. This means that for QOS calculations, one need only examine the impact of each power system element failing by itself, although, QOS Analysis should examine multiple simultaneous Failures for power system clcments with an A, less than about 0,995.
In general, one should design the electrical plant using reliable components and sufficient redundancy and reconfigurability to minimize the cases where the failure of a single element of the power system will result in one or morc Quality of Service failures.
For most naval power systems, the prime movers are either gas turbines or diesel generators. While a sufficiently high Operational Availability is achievable for these prime movers, their MTBF can typically be measured in the thousands of hours.
Hence the power system design must provide sufficient capacity, redundancy and reconfigurabihty to achieve the desired 30,000-hour QOS MTBF.
With all generators onlinc, the power system should have sufficient capacity to serve the worst case load. With all but any one generator online, the powcr system should have sufficient capacity to service the worst case load less the exempt long-term interrupt loads. Normally, non-IPS ships will not have exempt long-tcrm interrupt loads and the criterion is in effect an N+l rule. For IFS ships, the exempt long-tem interrupt loads are normally a portion of the propulsion load, ensuring sufficient capacity with one or more generators off line for ship service loads.
For systems without energy storage modules, under any normal operating condition, generators should be sized and the power syslem configured such that the loss of each onlinc gencrator by itself rcsults in sufficient remaining online generation capacity to service all Un-interruptible and short term interrupt loads. (See Option A o f Figure 4) For systcms with energy storage modules, under any normal operating condition, generators should be sized and the power system configurcd such that the Ioss of each gencrator by itself results in suflicient remaining online gcneration capacity plus energy storage power capacity to service all Uninterruptible and short term intempt loads. The encrgy capacity of the cnergy storage modulc should account for:
A generator set tripping off line repeatedly after bcing loaded. One should assume that the generator trips offline 3 times for 5 minutes in duration, with each trip occurring in less than a minute after it is brought on line
Recharging the cnergy storage module should be accomplished as quickly as possible but should not requirc the shedding of any othcr load. Limiting the recharge time to under four to six hours is reasonable.
Option B of Figure 4 shows how an energy storage module can augment a small generator set to provide hold up time to short term interrupt and Uninterruptible loads until a sufficiently large standby generator i s brought online. Option C of Figure 4 shows how a larger energy storage module can enable single engine cniise operation by providing sufficient capacity to service all Uninterruptible and short term interrupt loads until a sufficiently large standby generator is brought online. Where possible, power electronics conversion devices shouId incorporate hot-swappablc power modules and suflicient installed redundancy and capacity to enable replaccment of failed modules without suffcring a Quality of Service failure. Alternately, the power electronics conversion devices should be significantly more reliable than the target QOS MTBF of 30,000 hours.
To maximizc the amount of long-term interrupt loads, loads that have multiple levels of operation may designate different QOS categories to each level. For examplc, IPS designs could assign QOS categories to different increments of propulsion power: suficient power to maintain steeragcway could be short term interrupt, the remaining propulsion powcr required to maintain the ordered speed would be long-term interrupt. Likewise, the design of the electrical Lighting in a space should enable assigning half as long term interrupt loads and the othcr half as short term interrupt loads. The loss of half the lighting in a space for 5 minutes should not significantly impact the ship's operations.
From the discussion above, designing the electric plant for QOS rcquires knowledge as to the total anticipated load in each QOS category for various operationat conditions. The authors propose that this data be captured as an additional field in the Electric Plant Load Analysis (EPLA). The EPLA is currcntly used to size distribution system equipment, power cables, and generation capacity.' Extending its functionality to include QOS information should not be difficult.
V. QOS AND ELECTRIC PLANT CONTROLS DESIGN
Electric Plant Controls play a critical role in achieving QOS. The power systcm must also be controllabIe to enable both QOS load shedding and Mission Priority Load Shedding. Load shedding can be accomplished by opening a switch or circuit breaker in the power system, or by scnding a control command to the load to shut down. To enable the loads to shut down in an orderly and safe fashion, this latter method is preferred if the load supports this capability. Figure 5 shows the expected response of the control system to loss of an online generator in a nolional three generator set plant. The immediate reaction of the system is to shed sufficient Long Term Interrupt loads fast enough to prevent overloading the remaining ontine generator and causing it to trip off line as well. The control system must reconfigure the electrical distribution system to ensure all Short Term Interrupt loads are restored within 2 seconds. Additionally, the standby generator is commanded to start and come online. Within five minutes, the Standby Generator should be operational and the Long Term interrupt loads restored. Ideally, the machinery control system would continually perform contingency planning in the background to develop an optimal response to likely casualties. In the case of Figure   6 , if the machinery control system can quickly (in less than a second) determine that neither of the offline generators could be started, then it could skip the QOS Load Shedding step and transition directly to Mission Priority Load Shedding.
VI. SINGLE ENGME OPERATIONS
Single engine opcrations are being considered to save fuel especially in IPS plants where large single gcnerators can offer a significant combination of mobility and other operational capability. A Quality of Service analysis should inchde mission CONOPS and plant reconfiguration scenarios and single engine operations offers challenges to electric plant design and control.
VII. QOS AND SURVIVABILITY
Warship Electric Plant design must account for Survivability in addition to QOS. Many of the featurcs provided to achicvc QOS requirements will make the ship more survivable, however only designing for QOS is not sufficient. In particular, the faiture modes considercd for QOS purposes are significantly different from those that must be considercd for survivability. As stated previously, designing for Quality of Service is largely a matter of accounting for the failure modes of the least reliable equipment in the power systcm, and ensuring that the system responds in a manner such that loads do not experience a Quality of Service failure. The probability of failure for power system equipment under battle damage conditions is not directly related to reliability.
Furthermore, battle damage usually rcsults in multiple simultaneous faults, generally concentrated in a specific damaged geographic part of a ship. For QOS calculations, the failure of highly reliable distribution system equipment such as transformers, cabling, and switchgear, if sized properly, is not of significant concern. On the other hand, the failurc of these devices is highly probable in a battle damage scenario.
For future warship designs, ship survivability will likely be specified in terms of a Design Threat Outcome when subjected to Design Threats. If a ship is expectcd to rcmain afloat and recover from damage, then the size, location, redundancy, physical propcrties and geographic location of powcr system components as well as the reconfigurability and fault isolation capability of the system design become very important. Non-redundant mission critical Short-Term and Long-Term interrupt loads may bc provided with multiple sources of power to enable their continued operation if undamaged whcn subjected to a design threat. Zonal ship design considerations to address survivability and quality of service issues are discussed in [7] .
VII. FUTURE WORK
The concept of Quality of Service as presented in this paper ha:: not been devcloped sufficiently for institutionalization into the ship design process. This lack of formality should not prevent ongoing ship designs from considuring or using QOS in their system design. Additional tasks that should be completed as quickly as possible include:
Gain a better understanding of power system equipment faiIurc modes and their impact to QOS to dctcmtne appropriate MTBF and Ao to use in QOS calculations. Understand the impact of the failure of Uninterruptible loads on the QOS of other aggrcgated Unintemptible loads. Develop specific: dcsign guidancc for classifying loads into Uninterruptible , short-term interrupt, and long tcrm interrupt loads. Dcvclop estimating relationships for determining thc electrical load in each of the different categories to assist in early stage ship design. Incorporate QOS based dcsign into early stage ship design tools. Gain industry feedback on the proposed methodology presented in this paper in preparation for dcveloping modifications to the Naval Vessel Rules (NVR).
Modify thc requirement for the Electric Plant Load Analysis to include fields for QOS category. Dcvclop in-zone distribution and control architectures and concepts to minimize the cost of implementing both QOS and Mission Priority load shedding. Develop Cost Estimating Relationships to reflect the proposed changes in power system design.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Designing shipboard power systems for QOS will ensure that under normal operating conditions that the ship will likely be able to perform its mission. Because of the changing charactcristics of the prime movers, distribution systems, and loads, past practice will no longer suffice to achieve a good design. Using a design mcthod that accounts for QOS, such as the onc proposed in this paper, is vitally important in meeting the Navy's objective for continuity of the electrical power supply.
